The UK’s international counter-terrorism policy - Foreign Affairs - Select Committee - 07/05/2024

excuse me delayed because of the train uh order order welcome to this hearing of the Foreign Affairs committee uh which is our penultimate hearing as part of our counter terrorism inquiry uh the last will be with ministers Aman grateful if you can kindly introduce yourself yes my name is aan Dean um and in a past life I used to work uh in an undercover capacity uh for the UK intelligence and Security Services do you have any ation you need to make before we start um I don't think there's anything relevant apart from the fact that I went you know worked in banking um so yeah perfect um and as obviously you know parliamentary privilege does apply um well thank you ever so much for joining us this morning um you joined alqaeda in the 9s I'm interested in your view of how you think alqaeda has changed as an organization since then particularly kind of post 911 period and how you think the ideology and their objectives have shifted since then and also since the emergence of dis as part of that well they moved from analog to digital I mean that's exactly what happened and and then after that um they kept changing their uh objectives from Global to Regional to local and they adapted according to whatever Branch um you know they have established in whatever country like in Yemen uh they have their own different goals and um aspirations in Somalia uh shabab even even though they declared their allegiance to alqa but nonetheless they remain um committed to the Horn of Africa and to their uh objectives in the Horn of Africa so they changed really forgive me why do you think AQ was able to remain resilient despite the death of Bin Laden at the end of the day I think alqa was about an idea um that in it is part of a civil war within Islam if we can call it this way because um there is a war between those who believe in the nation state you know as a concept an institution a um you know a perfect model uh to live in the 20 and 20 first century and those who believe in transnational ideologies in in another word empire building um so the idea is that all of these borders need to be raised in order to create that pan Islamic uh C Al started that um aspiration and then slowly gradually other groups picked up on that including Isis and why do you think the Horn of Africa has become this hub for Al-Qaeda you know obviously I think historically back to my childhood where yes you have Bosnia and chia but a lot of the activity was in the Middle East so why do you think the Horn of Africa has become this new hub for them whatever there are ungoverned spaces um and chaos and lack of central governance uh you always find this disease you know spreading around um that's why we call them non-state actors because they flourish in places where the rule of law and governance so weak and in contrast to that so the emirati foreign minister back in 2017 said that Europe was going to become or should be classed as an incubator of terrorism and that he thought that the root for radicalism was becoming a lot more ripe within Europe so how does that sit with your explanation of being ungoverned spaces do you think that was a fair explanation for him to make or statement for him to make not necessarily because when we talk about ungoverned spaces we're talking about the place where um The Authority the ability to carry arms and to establish you know uh Authority by force that's where you have the proliferation of uh such uh ideology if you look for example however for radicalization that's a different issue altogether if you look at Saudi Arabia and Tunisia we are looking at at you know the two uh far ends of the Spectrum in the Arab world one is uh secular and the other is conservative at least until recently so Saudi Arabia during the height of the recruitment for Isis roughly about 145 per million joined Isis um Tunisia was fiercely secular under uh Habib BBA and then after that under bin Ali it was absolutely secular and yet immediately after the Arab Spring and then uh the rise of Isis 206 out of every million joined uh you know Isis it was more than any other Arab country um so it's not necessarily um because the environment is secular and there is a strong rule of law and there is a strong government I think there are other uh factors at play and if you compare even Tunisia to Europe you know the UK 345 out of a million um France 354 out of a million Belgium 722 out of a million so the numbers are really big even bigger than that in Europe Fabian thank you chair um I was just wondering if you could tell us a bit more I mean about the um motivations underlying the reasons that people join jihadist jihadist Terror groups I mean have those reasons evolved are they more complex now than they were say 25 years ago or 24 years ago since 2001 one um is it to do with increasing inequality in society is it as you said to do with ungoverned spaces the rule of law um is it just to do with a perception of decadence and islamophobia can you tell us a bit more goodness there is so much you know to um unpack here but I can tell you that um we we have to understand that no one wakes up one day and decide oh today I'm going to be a terrorist I'm going to join a terrorist group and I'm going to go and kill everyone around no it doesn't happen like that it all starts with good intentions it all starts with good intentions the path to hell is paved with good intention and this is why the you know in Islamic uh principles that good intentions are not good enough you need to have wisdom with it however when I was 16 wisdom was in short supply and I think even when you are 26 and even 36 is still wisdom is in short supply so this is the role of the elders and this is why you know when the elders neglect their duties in sharing their wisdom with the young and trying to tell them that don't do this don't go down this path it will lead only to suffering misery and uh death and destruction if there were if these voices were more Amplified you know then things would have been different but unfortunately these voices were more muffled actually than Amplified the the the reality is that there are many complex answers for this to include you know grievance but not all grievances are legitimate just because someone want to build an Empire oh I want to build my Empire get out of my way that is not a legitimate you know grievance then you have the question of Western culture being dominant people just get angry and frustrated about it um so they feel their uh voices are silence I'm talking about certain parts of the Arab and Muslim world and then you have the desire for empowerment that's an important uh motivation I mean you see many of these people as soon as they are ending up in these Jihad theaters if you can call it this way you see them you know taking pictures and posing with weapons you know and they feel that sense of Pride you know they feel that there is that you know empowerment because they feel that they are marginalized they feel powerless wherever they came from and and then once they are there that inner desire for power is liberated and this is one of the reasons why prisons were um a fertile ground for recruitment because many of these people experience humiliation but also experience guilt about the things they've done so when there is an ideology that comes that offers Redemption through um you know struggle and fighting and Dying For A Cause while at the same time liberating the inner sadism in order to become violent but in the in a way that is rewarding um if we could talk about it I could be talking about it for hours you know just to explain the multi-layered complex nature of radicalization this is why there isn't one single Jihadi prototype I used to see all people from the phds all the way down to the prison graduates would it be fair to say that one of the one of the antidotes to Violent radicalization might be education it's at the core of it not it's only education but critical thinking with without without asking people to really look deep into the consequences of their actions and at the same time understanding that the world is far more complex if you tell people this is a nation state you live in but if you try to bring down that nation state the result will be there will be no ATM outside to withdraw cash there will be no ambulance to come and pick you up there will be no school to educate you and your kids there will be no uh police to come and help you if there is anything that it goes wrong that is I think when we start to tell people that don't bring down the state structure because what will replace it will be far worse can I then ask you how you think the UK and this should be an area you know quite a bit about how the UK can disrupt the appeal of jihadist terrorism I mean what fact s we've already talked about some of the factors that draw recruits from the West to groups such as Dash and Al-Qaeda um but but can you tell us a bit more about how we how we could disrupt this the best way to disrupt and there aren't any silver bullets here but this the best way to disrupt is always debate and the reason for debate is because that is how you insert the virus of Doubt into the minds of those who would use the absolute certainty of their faith to carry out unspeakable atrocities I mean so how do you stop someone from taking a knife and stabbing someone and taking someone else's life if you put a doubt in his mind that well you do that you're not going to end up somewhere nice in fact like you know you will have to answer and pay for what you've done so inserting doubt even 1 two 3% doubt into the mind of someone who just went into that path of radicalism could disable that violent threshold basically can you tell us a bit more I mean in your view you mentioned this already about the types of people who join jihadist Terror groups you mentioned the the PHD graduate and then the prison graduate but is there a particular character trait or multiple character traits that push people towards J jihadist Terror and violence more so than any other within the jihadist context there is one common denominator um which is Redemption and seeking Redemption because in a sense you know unlike unlike Catholicism where you know you go to a priest you confess your sins and you you know and that's it you gain Absolution there isn't that system within Islam I mean you you have to repent directly to God and you have no idea if your repentance is accepted and also the same time you know there has been some crisis in the state of preaching um within Muslim societies over the past 50 60 70 years because of the Advent you the Advent of Western culture and um you know liberal values so you know preaching in Islam used to be based on three pillars love hope and fear you know you love the Lord you hope for his reward and um you know you fear his damnation so a standard preaching will be to divide your uh preaching into 3/3 however I think the emphasis on damnation and the Eternal punishment has pushed significant in know number of young people to think that's it I have no hope you know the way like and I'm listening to you know preaching these days you people just keep telling their congregations Out of Love Of course out of the idea that they want to safeguard their congregations from whatever temptations that if you drink hell if you smoke hell if you deal drugs hell if you join a gang hell but you know there isn't that incentive that well if you don't do any of this you'll go to heaven I mean so they have replaced you know some of them not all of them but some of them you know replaced you know hope with fear and that created more a generation of guilty people like I mean who would say Haram to everything who would say like I mean that no you shouldn't do that you shouldn't greet people for Christmas you shouldn't like I mean mix with people who are outside of our faith Circle you see it's it's it starts with guilt and then that guilt unfortunately again through the desire to do good end up in a way that people end up doing bad can I ask you to that point around critical thinking a lot of people who've left terrorist groups talk about having that moment when they realize you know for example why is it my leaders keep asking me to blow myself up why they want me to have this great uh Eternal hopeful future but they don't want it themselves was there a turning point for you where you thought I need to leave Al-Qaeda or was it that you were just approached by an effective recruiter and then what was it there's one thing to leave an organization there's another to actively turn against them and to obviously work against them for the secret Services can you talk us through what that Journey was for you doubt it's all started with doubt um I think the F the first thing you have to have something like of a moral compass pointing through North a little bit at least and on top of this the fact that you have also that fear of God you know that you know you don't want to do the wrong thing and so you become more and more inquisitive about the legitimacy of whatever um you know you are asked to do so it was the East Africa bombings uh 1998 um so I remember that day ited my memory it was fourth of August and when it happened uh of course I was shocked by the number of civilian casualties I mean there were 12 American diplomats killed but there were more than 220 uh innocent people from um tanzanians uh Kenyans Somalians um ugandans I mean and that was you know too much for me even to contemplate and to understand even you know and to put it within a context to justify it and I wasn't thinking that this is what's going to be I thought prior to that and this is the first time alq used a terrorism on a massive scale I thought we are joining AQA in order to really harass the US forces within the Middle East not go and kill innocent people you know going about their own daily lives in Africa this is where it all started thank you chair and good afternoon Aman can I ask how successful uh is groups like alqaeda and das's online radical radicalization who is most vulnerable to it and how how influential are there online magazines who who are they targeting in the 1990s recruitment used to be peer-to-peer uh because it was really um there was no digital means and so you have to go and recruit people one by one more or less just like a fishing rod and you have to catch them one by one the net really brought the era of the net and you you have have an whole net net cast wide in order to catch as many people as possible because in the past you couldn't invade 100,000 living rooms 100,000 smartphones 100,000 um you know bedrooms you know at night with your videos with your tweets with your post with your you know secret um you know telegram posting you know this wasn't possible but you see the explosion and no pun intended you know the explosion in a number of of recruits took place as the means of communication became more prevalent and easy and widespread and that started even to Target more people who are Tavy people who are you know curious who are they the young um I I remember that in the 1990s I was maybe the youngest of one of the youngest people there but then can you start to see in the in you know in the 2000s the age brackets started to drop to the point where we started to see is is recruiting children not only like basically from the the you know the male side of it but also from the female side what steps do you think the UK could be taking uh to tackle this threat there are no more effective measures than the seeds of Doubt always you have to destroy the credibility of the people who carry out the recruitment why don't you go why is it that you know you want me to go but your kids are going to this University or in this to this college or they are enjoying life in this public school I mean why is it that you get get to enjoy the fruits of this life but you're more than happy to send other people to their Slaughter I think there is always that it's the same way you know in the other area that I work more constantly which is Terrorism Finance not that I provide terrorism Finance like counter terrorism Finance so in that field the disruption happened through highlighting how most of that money end up in the pockets of those who are raising it you know and doesn't actually reach even the groups that you know the donations were intended to and so through highlighting the embezzlement of those who are raising funds and because fundraising and recruitment go Hand inand by the way so when you do that you start to hurt both fundraising and recruitment do you think we're doing that is that not effectively quickly before I bring in NE ask you it was interesting when you said about the move to starting recruiting women when you joined Al-Qaeda were they actively targeting women in the90s or was it solely people to fight and do you think it is that transition towards the creation of a caliphate and therefore the need for repopulation or do you think that there's something else that suddenly saw them wanting to Target women and bring more women to join them and on that path of radicalization I think it was you know when the Jihad started to take root in Syria that the idea of a territory and a territory need to be populated that women need to be uh recruited I remember that was entirely male you know dominated and the females were just only the wives or the daughters and the sisters of you know the senior people even uh most of us were just single men it was a practical requirement rather than some great Rejuvenation that actually recruiting women and yeah yeah recruitment recruitment of women became you know prevalent because it was a necessity thank you NE it used to be the case that uh in prison and online were the two key areas for radicalization is that still uh the worst place to be radicalized but are they the worst places to be radicalized and and I think you just said was sufficient um Effectiveness in tackling online regulation so what what what more powers or resources are needed to tackle the problem the three key areas where people are vulnerable you're talking about the online space you're talking about University campuses and prisons I know like these three are far in between they almost make a triangle but the reality is that University campuses is where people you know go there in order to think they will change the world and when you offer someone the means to change the world you know through a radical way some of them unfortunately will take it in prison these are souls looking for three things mainly Redemption empowerment and the means to liberate their inner violent you know uh sadism and online this is where people who are curious who want to know you know they want to find out answers I mean they are and the problem with online is the fact that it all start with several um you know uh starting points there are there isn't one starting point some people start from the conspiracy theories you know this world is run by a certain group of people a cabal or whatever and you know we have to fight against this cabal and so they are to conspiracy theories and then that conspiracy theories then lead them down the path of well I must do something other people end up in the world of fantasies invented you know um you know you know due to Civil Wars within Islam in dynastic actually war wars within Islam 1300 years ago in order to look into prophecies eschatology and about the end of time and well these are the battles of the end of of time God ordained this fight and I need to join it who am I to argue with the Divine I need to join this fight so again it's a really complex phenomenon they're not being taught this in University you you saying that they sort of hang on to an idea and then explore it further and that's where the conspiracies come in so is this you know the algorithm of escalation is for both right-wing and uh uh Islamic jihadist um extremism are the platforms doing enough to tackle that and does the government have sufficient powers to be monitoring and intervening to try and prevent that escalator it's not about power it's about knowledge I mean if I tell you about an object that you have to look for me but I tell you this is the object but I don't give you any good description how will you find it so first of all those who are supposed to enforce you know the laws and ations and the powers they need to know what they're looking for first in the in the first place and this is I think one of the reasons is just the um I think it's just the lack of awareness and the lack of full understanding a holistic approach to what actually makes a jihadist because there isn't one single Journey you have to imagine Jihad as a river and all the other factors are tributaries to it just on that um point about um Redemption empowerment and you said in a means of sadism for prisoners isn't it also is there a um a link between University and prison in that both are seeking a sense of order and ideology maybe more of an ideology at University but a sense of order in their lives of prison and radical Islam islamicislamic I would call it the islamist um ideology driven groups and I'm talking here about you when I say islamist I mean political Islam yeah that's what what I mean like I mean so most of it most of these groups actually were founded in universities and know this is where it all started because they seek they see they think that the world is chaotic around them that you know and especially during the 50s and 60s you know the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and uh jihadism is because of you know that pull and push between you know communism and capitalism between socialism and you know free market and the question is you know as the Muslim world is being squeezed you know from both sides you know why aren't we United and everyone started to yarn and become nostalgic to an Era that actually hardly existed it's just a romanticizing of the history led to the idea that we could all be United one big large empire which basically never happened like you know in the entire history of Islam except for 59 years so this is I think like in aw this ideology of empowerment but you know similar to how communism started idea is a world revolution in order to unite all the people in one uh Happy semi- utopian um Empire but it's just not going to work and and you when you're talking about that you're talking about Saia yes okay just looking at the structure of his ideas do you think there is a similarity in structure although clearly very different because one was very secular one was very religious between KU and between the bolik and sort of marxist leninism or do you think in their structure they're really very different actually say KB in his early life was a socialist and so therefore he was affected and influenced by socialism and the idea is that you know to borrow the framework of socialist you know society and a structure of governance and to bring it into Islam in order to create that revolutionary sense Islam generally wasn't really revolutionary throughout 1300 years of its existence you know it was more of a religion that left the leadership of the state to Statesmen Kings Royals you know princes uh tribal leaders but did not involve the clergy in the ruling I mean the first cleric since the prophet Muhammad to actually Ascend into power and any in the Muslim Community was and there is 1400 years difference between you know the two and that tells you that Islam never actually gave ruling and the uh governance to the clergy it gave it to you know the um to the ruling class who are the ruling class merchants interest I think you wanted to come in on that point yeah in your view what is the most effective form of government government to counter the threat of radicalization uh and terrorism uh for instance monarchies autocratic leaderships in the Middle East the reality is that you know the Middle East is a complex place and we I know I always advise people especially like I know from the private sector is not to refer to the Middle East as just one you know homogeneous you know Zone there are two zones there there is the Royal Zone and there is the non-royal zone so the Royal Zone inherently stable the non-royal zone is inherently unstable um and there is a reason for that like in the Middle East is the birth of monarchy you know and you know from the beginning like I mean King Sargon of aad and you know and hamurabi and um you know the Mesopotamian King Kingdom and then spreads you know throughout it's been around for about 7,000 years I think this kind of system I think we more or less you know see that it has established its roots and its legitimacy so in tribal societies um what is a king but a glorified tribal shake at the end of the day and therefore the social contract between Kings and their people is far more binding than autocratic generals um or um you know dictatorial presidents of a republic like because there is a difference the king is looked at as a legitimate in know form of governance that been around for thousands of years while the other one is just a usurper who just took the place he's a commoner like the rest of us you know why is he better than the rest of us uh but and I think this is why you see the difference here that the countries uh in the Arab world the six GCC countries plus uh Jordan and Morocco despite everything despite all the challenges they are resilient um and that all the countries where um the monarchies ended up you know overthrown Iraq Libya um Iran um you know you can tell you know what really happened um they became inherently unstable what you think about how we as democracies engage with uh those types of leaderships because often uh we will uh have our own views of of leadership of our values of democracy do you think there's a would you just comment on how we engage with those types of countries is by acknowledging that you know while democracy is the most admirable governance system that man has created so far it cannot always be applied overnight and there has to be that kind of transition and the best vehicle for transition uh into that system you know is the monarchies uh one one of the greatest missed opportunities in Afghanistan was when the US objected to the return of King Muhammad zahar Shah to Afghanistan he would have United everyone including the Taliban eventually because Kings command in a tribal Society far greater status and far greater legitimacy and therefore their words are heeded the the oath of Allegiance uh in Islam given to Kings is the same as the one that given to a CIF so there is that religious um anointment let's put it this way an ordination to this oath that you give to the king and therefore I think it was a missed opportunity because then um you know Afghanistan ended up where it is right now um 20 years later and I think like this is why the engagement need to be first by accepting that this is the current reality we can work with it because that is the best outcome right now any attempt to destabilize it is going to create even more trouble down the line and Beyond monarchy what other factors do you think bring about stability in the region can you think of any preservation of tradition while at the same time uh introducing modernity um both socially economically and in the field of science that is important you know it's like the steady ship you know going forward there is no going backward and this is why you will see that only the monarchies in the Middle East seems to have uh improve their HDI more than any other uh of their neighbors just look at the uh human development index of Saudi Arabia the UAE Kuwait Qatar Oman and compared to Egypt Iran Iraq and the rest it's just abysmal for the rest while it's almost approaching European standards in the GCC countries just on that final point is is that because those people that took power did so in the name of Socialism or communism which has not been particularly successful in many human societies and effectively Kings have allowed a sort of something approaching a democratic capitalism or is it more complex than that it is more complex because Iran is theocracy I mean in the name of religion and yet it's a failed State uh Taliban is going to be a failed State at some point so this is why it is important to understand that it's not just because the abandonment of um Islamic tradition because Kings within a tribal sector or sry a tribal Society do actually have a responsibility of preserving tradition and among under that umbrella of tradition is religion so they are viewed as the Guardians of you know virtue values and therefore no one question whether they are legitimate or not and whether they're the way they run their government is legitimate even though you know countries such as the UAE or Kuwait are absolutely liberal you know by any standards the Arab world uh and and yet you know you there is the sense that their leaders are also the Guardians of conservative values but once you lose once a monarch loses their role in Afghanistan for example isn't it almost impossible to bring that Monarch back because once the the magic of being the irrational um idea of monarchy goes it's very very difficult to recreate and you're assuming that in Afghanistan could have been recreated because the last king was still alive at that time um this is why there was a chance there was just that chance and his memory was still there thank you Cher um could I ask about the potential impact of October the 7th and the the conflict in in Gaza on the growth of of radicalization and how concerned we should be about that and is that evidence that Al-Qaeda Iranian proxies for example have exploited the conflict and have you seen a greater level in support and funding of those groups since October the 7th and where should we be looking for that potential growth in those dangers please keep going okay just making sure like I don't have to no no there are no votes no go okay when it comes to terrorism is cyclical there is that you know Cycles like the moon so I always used to say that you know we always have that full moon sometime we had Afghanistan in the 1980s we had Bosnia and chesa in 1990s we had Iraq in the 0s we had Syria in the 210s uh 20110 so this is when you know you a new moon with this gravity you know bringing you know out all of this you know upheaval um and causing people to become lunatic and so this is I think where we have a situation now where Gaza is now the new Syria this is the gravitational pull that is bringing people you know or bringing out the worst in people unfortunately again because the lack of wisdom lack of understanding lack of awareness um you know so for example like I mean when you talk about October 7 the question is you know yes Hamas did it but you know since 2014 it is my assessment that Hamas seed to be a national Palestinian Liberation movement and became an Iranian tool so it wasn't doing anything on behalf of the average Palestinian it was doing it on behalf of the AAS of tan um and so this is why um you know and and yet like I mean many people still are blind to this uh fact so this blindness is the lack of awareness lack of Education lack of wisdom um people are not confronting back with you know uh facts and evidence-based facts and and therefore when the narrative is hijacked by radicals who try to simplify it simplify this whole comp in know complex conflict when in fact it is as complex as it could be this is when radicalization happened and unfortunately since October 7 a Revival of Isis in Syria in Afghanistan um in Iraq and also a Revival of alq in Yemen and we start to see more funding going to a shabab in Somalia um we started to see the Taliban you also improving their uh funding uh mechanism especially through trade in um uh Commodities all of this highlight the fact that Gaza became a lucrative brand in itself not only just for you know the uh Sunni terrorist groups but also for the you know Iranian Shia uh um Network a threat Network such asah and theis in Yemen and uh the militias in Iraq is there any evidence you talked a lot there about you sort of Syria Iraq and Somalia is there any evidence of a domestic upsurge should we aware of anything that's going on domestically and the increase radicalization since October the 7th I don't think there is anything that basically make it domestic you know in places like Yemen and Iraq and Syria because the war has been going on there for years and years the conflict and the Dynamics of the conflict been there for very long time it's just the opportunity again that cycle that new moon that has risen called Gaza uh you know it is the best way to exploit uh people's emotions anger uh frustration and it is a perfect you know neon sign for recruitment can I just finally this last question just take you back to something you said way at the beginning about the the nation state and that pivot H is well the question would be has there been a pivot away from that sort of global transnational terrorism to more of a a sort of localized focus and is there any evidence for that you will see that in the protests around the globe or in the recruitment efforts or in the fundraising Gaza plays an important part and yet how many of those involved are actually originally Palestinians you know from Gaza or even the West Bank or from the diaspora and you will find that the majority are actually nonp Palestinians some of them non-arabs you know from the Indian subcontinent or from uh you know subsaharan Africa so you see that you know that so really they are not galvanized by domestic um nation state concerns they are actually galvanized by this notion of pan Islamic solidarity as a precursor towards a pan Islamic action to establish you know a CIT again that the idea of the copit started to take you know uh Center Stage again just look at what happened in Hamburg just a few days ago when a group of protesters in their hundreds you know CH you know carrying black flags and chanting you know uh slogans for the return of the cipit in Hamburg in Germany thank you NE and um some of the protests that we've seen here we've seen the emerg or reemergence if you like of some um terrorist paraphernalia hamas's paraphernalia on including on the Streets of London do you feel the police are trained sufficiently to identify uh and intervene when uh um when we see the symbols the flags the leaflets the literature uh and and is prevent I know prevent is overseen by the home office rather than foreign office but is this is prevent resourced enough do you feel to intervene to prevent people going down a path of radicalization um again you know the theistic issues here are very complex because of the um sacred laws when it comes to uh freedom of speech and so the question is how do you define the very thin line between uh free speech and incitement um and what is it that actually caused radicalization and what is it that is just political you know speech um it might be radical it might be not to the taste of everyone one um but it is still a legitimate speech in the mind of those who you know authored it um I I I think it is quite subjective and it is really up to you know the um authorities to judge Case by case but if let's say there is as Hamas is a prescribed organization if their literature were to be spread then this is in itself an incitement this is in itself a crime the question is does the police take action you know generally speaking my experience over the past 25 years looking at how different governments around the world deal with terrorism is the fact that you know the more you try to appease people to avoid confrontation will invite confrontation so the more you show moral back in know backbone and The Bravery to confront and head on not try to skirt around it that would generate that level of not only just fear but respect from the other side in order to step back and to think about what they are doing thank youan thank you chair um I'm trying to remember when there was last a calipat in Hamburg but um I can't kind kind of work that one out um can I move on to financing terrorism because I think they often say if you want to stop a criminal action you look at you follow the money so how did the financing of terrorism evolve do you think in the wake of restrictions imposed following 9/11 how do you expect it to change in the next few years who are the main donors and finances of of jihadist Terror groups because you know I wonder where they're located and what they motivation is why would they give money is it to defund Terror from a shared ideology or is it to leverage specific geopolitical outcomes sorry multifaceted question no um you know at at some point I remember in 2016 I was you know standing for eight hours on my feet explaining to um the captain of the diamond industry in the anwp world Diamond Center you know how terrorism Finance work and it took eight was just including question and answer like you know so um it's it's it's a really complex uh place but I can just condense it and to say that terrorist groups you know are two you know um categories state sponsored and the non-state sponsored so the state sponsored something likeah theis because they have a state sponsor such as um tahan so and then of course like you know they have other means of funding including criminal Enterprises uh weapon smuggling you know um narcotics narcotics becoming a important uh staple of um uh hasah um and the Syrian regime um financing you know for example like in the captagon which is called the zombie drug which is even started to become available here uh in the streets of the UK and Germany and France like you this is all manufactured in Syria and manufactured in Lebanon and then shipped here um but before that it to be what what was the target the target was Saudi Arabia the UAE Kuwait um and it is we're talking about multi-billion Dollar business you know annually so this is the state sponsor now if we go to the non-state sponsor such as a Taliban Isis um a shabab there are multitude of funding uh streams so you have donations coming from the diasporas or coming from the ideologically like-minded people who see in their struggle a you know a kindered spirit something like you know basically that they share with it's a common cause however also there is the business networks what many people don't understand is the fact that in the 1990s uh uh the precursor to Isis which was the isi or the Islamic State of Iraq in uh 20 in the 2000s they built a network of businesses Farms um consumer goods places uh cafes and restaurants retail in order to generate funds to keep laundering that cash and to make sure basically that they have a network of intelligence gathering through these shops and um and the legitimate businesses but also at the same time in order to generate funds um exploitation of Natural Resources that's what the shabab do with the coal and copper of Somalia and selling it in the markets in Kenya and Uganda and Ethiopia um of course you have the haala system uh the haala system in itself is alive um in fact it hasn't been even better than before and the reason is because of the conflicts the conflicts have now driven tens of millions of people out of their homes you know in Syria in Libya in Yemen in Iraq and Iran in Pakistan Afghanistan so you end up with tens of millions of people fueling this black economy so hiding among those big numbers like you are now hiding maybe 20 40 50 um uh needles within one single Hast stack sorry within billion Hast stack sorry thank you very much thank you chair I think that's a really interesting point you made because you said earlier that uh radicalization Finance go hand in hand and exact to that point diet most of its funding came from small Western Union transfers of less than 50 Quid at a time from the UK it wasn't the billions coming or the millions coming from big donors uh it's this small scale you might compare it to some political parties who are more focused on small donations than they are on the big ones now um royon you want to come in however on the states on the point yeah I can I talk to you about um involving terrorists in political settlements so you talked I think earlier about appeasement and showing show show of strength and a um and confronting the ideology or the terrorists um but an alternative and we're seeing it perhaps we're seeing it in Yemen where the houthis May well be part of a political settlement is that a good or a bad thing a political settlement can be reached if the objective you know of the group in question revolves around power um and revolves around um material gains the problem is if the group in question is not concerned with borders with you know staying within the uh confines of the you know internationally accepted borders then we have a problem um ideologically driven groups such as Hamas the hthis um and others basically like can have the idea that these borders are artificial and these are the uh construct of colonial era that needs needs to be deleted needs to be erased needs to be gone and I think this is where you know the question is how do you then expect to have a rational outcome from someone who might not be entirely rational they might be rational tactically but the strategy is not rational so and I think this is the exasperation that was expressed by multiple Regional leaders um in in the GCC when they complained publicly on TV about the irrationality of the other side uh Article 5 of the um Islamic Republic of Iran Article 5 of the uh constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran stipulate that who the leader of the country now now you might think like the leader of the country is Ayah k he's a supreme leader but really the real leader he's just a deputy the real leader is someone who's been missing for 1200 years so you have a child a 5-year-old who disappeared five you know 1200 years ago and just so happened that this child is by the article five of the Iranian uh Constitution is the leader of the statey and before um are just his deputies you know waiting for his return so this is why the Constitution says during his occultation someone will deputize on his behalf you know someone who has to be a grand cleric you know and uh Brave and uh in knowledgeable and experienced so this is the first red flag of irrationality I mean so you are waiting for someone like I mean you know the this isn't like you know basically a a traditional either monarchical or secular or liberal or even conservative this is just something out of the r of rationality and that we have to deal with it yet this particular problem of eschatology which I talked about as being the driving force for terrorism and radicalism across the Muslim World both the Sunni and the Shia divide is what is causing um you know uh most of our problems right now the M you know the idea that there is this Messiah figure coming um is driving driving the huis driving the Shia militias it drove Al before it drove Isis before because everyone have the idea that they are Paving the way for a savior so this eschatology and I you know wrote a a long paper about it before you know about 13 13 years ago where I talked about it in a sense that it's going to poison the minds of so many people especially young people by convincing them that you are God's instruments and therefore you must join God's Army and that's exactly where we are right now so what is the Battle Cry for the uh you know Iran sponsored Shia terrorist we're here for you Mahi and what is the battlecry you know for uh and is and shabab we are here to establish the state for the Mahi so we are you know CAU between two unfortunately radical visions that are fed by eschatology that is not even um rooted properly in Islamic texts I ask you then about I mean the West seem to look in the wrong direction when a lot of these organizations are becoming more radicalized and more capable are we in danger of seeing that again either in Afghanistan or in Yemen where in the last few weeks um aqap have take carried out taxs on the recognized government of vietman and are said to be working now with hand in hand and in glove with the houthis who are releasing Al-Qaeda prisoners and supplying them with drones and the rest you know are we in danger of seeing this happen again just somewhere else and the West not looking um or seeing it coming so much is there capabilities increasing in places like Afghanistan and Yemen and elsewhere yes I mean because the idea of using Al um and other Sunni radical groups incl Hamas is something that Iran perfected over the past two and a half decades um in 2002 and three and four when I used to work for the UK intelligence Services abroad uh in Arabia the orders used to come to alqa from where from Iran so ham who used to be the head of ala's operational uh command was based out of chabahar in Iran um sael was in zahedan and then he moved to tahan uh and many of the other leaders ended up under the protection of kasum suani himself and they their entire Focus even though alqa was fighting Iran in Iraq yet alqa in Iran was fighting alongside Iran against Saudi Arabia and trying to destabilize the uh Saudi royal family that has happened between 2002 until 2006 um and you know there is a brilliant documentary you know called the path of blood um it's available on um Apple TV like I mean this is where you will see how it was a an entire War it was a Warfare between alq and the Saudi authorities uh for four years and I think this is was mostly funded and directed from Al operatives based out of Iran and supported by Iran because at the end of the day the enemy of my enemy is my friend this is how another H is started to um apply this textbook Iranian textbook strategy and they started the process of supplying alq in Yemen with whatever they need in order to create that chaos and to make it difficult for the yemeni government because at the moment based on the uh truth between um the hthis and the Saudi government the theis are not going to attack M they are not going to attack and so they relegated that task to a third party and this is one of the reasons why I always argued that Iran cannot be trusted to be a nuclear power because of the presence and because of the founding establishing nurturing training and you know funding of so many proxies that you never know if they are going to build device modify it for land detonation and then hand it over to one of these terrorist groups especially if it's a Sunni one and then they say go and do with it whatever you want because at the end of the day it is deniable it's not my material it's not my bomb and I think this is why uh it is important to understand that the Middle East is truly truly the Battleground between the nation state the modern nation state as a concept of institution and the non-state actors that are there and just to show you how the canc of non-state actors is so prevalent in the Middle East how could it be that the Iranian Army standing is about 600,000 that's within Iran but they have a standing 700,000 Fighters fighting under their Banner outside of their border there are Iraqis in the militias hasah alone have 100,000 the huis have 300,000 so the question is how could there be uh this massive number of people underarms fighting for them and all under the banners of nonstate actors States within a state and also at the same time to make it even more bizarre is the fact that these groups some of them like the hthis possess weapons with long range offensive capability exceeding 2,000 kilometers that is more than what the armies of Egypt and turkey possess and turkey is a native member they don't have anything that can reach Beyond 2,000 kilm and then finally chairman um the houthis we are sure that are being funded as a proxy from Iran what about in Afghanistan and in Yemen with Al-Qaeda are they are they are they being funded directly um Isis in in in in Afghanistan and um al-Qaeda in Yemen are they being funded directly or they being funded indirectly or is Iran got nothing to do with that for Isis is a separate issue because after the fall of Isis in 2019 and you know when their last territory was taken over and extinguished their cash wasn't recovered and there were hundreds of millions of dollars of it and there was a question what happened to that cash so that cash most likely moved to Turkey and this is where it was converted invested and became the feeding or the seed money for uh other cells including um in Afghanistan it is no coincidence it's not a coincidence that we start to see a Resurgence of Isis in Afghanistan uh just when the Taliban started to have direct haala you know more semi official haala banking with turkey thank you of thank you chair um can I ask you about the the D detention camps in Northeast Syria do you think the UK pays enough attention to what's going on in those camps or be kind of less seen quick as forgotten attitude the these some of these people are kids and some of them will grow you know to become even more resentful and vengeful and the question is um it's better that they are under control um even if it is in prison here uh than for them to be on the loose out there without having any degree of control um and this is why this is why I think like I mean and this is something I floated in 2019 when I said that maybe the UK Sovereign Bas in Cypress could play an important role in terms of you know having a Detention Center there and you know processing their cases and you know passing sentences in terms of like you know establishing a court in order to try them because leaving them there indefinitely is going to create that uncertainty which could have an indefinite danger you know down the line um so they need to be under control somehow yeah but I don't if you saw there was a fascinating series reports from Alex Crawford on Sky News uh and she painted a pretty terrifying picture of the the women and children detention camps um and basically a breathing ground for a new generation of radicals do you think that the UK and the West generally is sufficiently robust in tackling what's going on in those camps or have they essentially left it to the Kurds to guard and control and hope for the best um I I think unfortunately the fact that all of them are gathered in one uh single camp and that camp will become unfortunately a breeding ground of radicalism of extremism they already people who seen enough death and Trauma um so instead of trying to first you know confront their radicalism and then rehabilitate them I mean Unfortunately they are left um to their devices in order to become more resentful more vengeful um in the future without any control and this is what why I'm stressing the fact that they are out there with minimum control is what worries me and I'm ask you forgive me I'm going to ask you to generalize here but what would be the general view of the the public and the in the region about those being held in the camps in Syria would they be sympathetic supportive apathetic and different what what is the that General opinion and have you noticed a shift at all depends who you ask but generally Isis is a toxic um Legacy right now uh in most of the population of the Middle East um especially after what they've done um and the atrocities they committed I think yet most of these women and children are viewed as the unfortunate idiotic uh people who just ended up in the wrong place um some of them are viewed with um suspicion that you know they came on their own valtion it's just the sympathy more is reserved for the children who were children at the time of the fall of the ISA territories thank you final two questions for me because I'm afraid we have to wrap up but just on that point about deradicalization I'm offered consider to be quite an extreme view on deradicalization which is I don't think you can deradicalize people because I think the psychological drivers remain there you can just redirect it or refocus it to a different area of obsession Focus so given that we spent a lot of time being told that we should take back all these people to the UK and particularly children I mean children's anyone under 18 allow them to live in society freely where do you think we sit on that in terms of being able to deradicalize people and then finally just what you think uh this is a very different question but what would be the biggest change you would make to either UK foreign policy or to our approach towards counterterrorism that you think would meaningfully make us safer from the risk from terrorism in terms of der radical ation I never really agreed with it like know because I agree with the term Rehabilitation um because I think this is the best approach uh counter violent extremism der radicalization I always find it to be unhelpful because it already carries a stigma like I mean the idea is that you have to confront you know the problem headon to say you are on the wrong path you know being member of this group is equivalent of being a member of you know a gang or a drug uh Circle or anything like that so you know you need to get out of that and therefore the question is you know how do we do Rehabilitation so it's not about deradicalization it's about taking away the violence you know and the driver towards violence um from the person in order for them to function normally or semi-norm within a society um that's the best you can hope for and then and then within time you hope that the seeds of doubt that you so in their in their minds will grow enough in order to make them think critically about the path they have taken before and how they can do what they need to do which is a uturn as for the UK foreign policy um it is my view and this is just personal view that the UK should conduct its foreign policy according to the interest of the UK and its people um it shouldn't be dictated by any loud voices from any minority um and this is why like I mean I think this is where the nation state assert its Authority uh asserts its uh entitlement to set the policy according to the Mandate in which they were elected um and this is how you know the government should behave with you know any dissenting voices is that look you know I'm the elected government I decide what foreign policy is the best for the UK and its population You can disagree no problem you can take a megaphone and shout all you want but if you step out of the line and use violence in order to uh assert your point this is when things uh will be different and the same thing with incitement to violence so to be clear you're making a distinction uh because you're not suggesting that you're functioning semi-norm you're rehabilitated right so you're not suggesting it's impossible for some what you're suggesting is that those who've committed violent acts should be treated differently to those who have not those with blood on their hands uh I don't think they should be treated exactly as those who you know thank God like you know basically I never had any blood in my hand like you so basically this is I think where those who got out early are not the same as those who got out too late so there has to be always a case by case so rehabilitation Works according to the needs of the individual some individuals went too deep and some individuals just realized that they were in the wrong path early on and did a return at the right time some might equally have had the will to shed blood on their hands but not have the opportunity and that's the challenge um thank you ever so much for your time I'm going to suspend the session briefly or order thank you the proceeding is currently suspended the proceeding is currently sus supended the proceeding is currently suspended the proceeding is currently suspended order order welcome back to the this hearing of the Foreign Affairs committee where we clearly please to be joined by Professor Evans uh Professor Evans can you kindly introduce yourself thank you chair so my name is Alexander Evans I'm a professor in practice in public policy at Londo School of Economics uh I've also been a career Diplomat for 21 years uh I I need to emphasize that I'm still a diplomat on sabatical uh so I'm not speaking on behalf of uh government at all uh and I think relevant to this inquiry I was I'm a former coordinator of the al-Qaeda Das Taliban uh monitoring team of United Nations security Council and I think you've heard from uh two of my earthw colleagues as well in previous sessions yeah thank you can you give us an overview of the current state of Dash Kazan um and essentially what threat it poses to the UK in our interests so I I should begin by saying I don't track it as closely as I would have uh in that United Nations Avatar uh but I still think there is an active threat to the United Kingdom uh both to Homeland Security and to UK Nationals overseas uh from Das in its International Network and indeed from Al-Qaeda and Affiliates globally uh and that's something we shouldn't lose sight of thank you and in terms of the relationship between dases and Das car is the terror can you unpack that for us slightly well I think when we peer into Afghanistan it's a complex terrain so it's tempting to reduce Afghanistan to sort of one amalgam of uh terrorist groups and organizations but actually I think you you even prior to the fall of carbal uh to the Taliban you had um a differentiated set of organizations ations operating in Afghanistan you even had differentiated fa factions within um the Taliban itself so you essentially now have a dis faction in Afghanistan that is an opposition uh to the Taliban regime uh but also in affiliation uh with elements in al-Qaeda but also other Regional groups and jamat and surilla a group operating in Tajikistan is one that should be mentioned in disregard is tabat actively working to defeat Das Kazan and do you see that being as a likelihood do they have the capability or the will do they have the capability I think that's questionable because I think trying to assert governance in Afghanistan was a difficult task at any moment in recent decades regardless of a flavor of government that was in control um do they have a will I think they certainly have a will not to be challenged by uh dish elements or indeed other armed groups in Afghanistan uh but I think the nature of Taliban capability in the country means that exercising that will is more challenging than trying to uh desire to exercise that will thank you and just before I bring in Fabian you were here for the last evidence session we heard the view that if the previous king of Afghanistan had essentially been brought back and a monarchy been reestablished you spent a lot of time in Afghanistan um and a lot of time getting no no tribes also across the border do you think there's any likelihood that that was actually possible it would have helped stabilize and bring back that governance that you say is so hard I I would perhaps offer a slightly more skeptical a about uh you know sort post post 911 Futures I I worked in Afghanistan for Yama before I joined the foreign office uh in early 2002 um a side comment on expertise on the area the fact that I'd worked in in Kashmir and Pakistan was considered to be good enough to be hard on a Tuesday and in carbal on the Sunday so there is a lesson here about longitudinal expertise in government um but but I I I I wonder how much a restoration of a monarchy would have been efficient to restore consensus and uh political Harmony in Afghanistan I do think but I I don't you know it's it's one of the whifs I think had Abdul hack one of the madin leaders not been murdered when he returned to Afghanistan might he have played a role in bridging in a different way possibly uh but I think in M that that's for historians and Regional experts to debate in future rather than uh for us to be confident would be true sorry one more final question Mr we've heard over the last few weeks um we had a former head of MI6 in here saying that we don't seem to have learned the lessons that you cannot bring a military solution to a political problem do you think that leads to a lot of the problems we're currently seeing in Afghanistan and potentially other theaters as well my my view in Afghanistan at least was ultimately one needed to pursue a political settlement uh I think uh you can you can't always achieve a political settlement and it's got to be a political settlement but respects for red lines you have as a nation and as a like-minded democratic Community um but that that doesn't that doesn't absent the need for force or the need for coercion uh and I think as the as the negotiation Specialists say you you the Zopa you know academics of course love love acronyms just like bureaucrats Zer is a zone of possible agreement right so if you're looking for a Zopa in a in an international conflict or in a national conflict you have to be confident that there is actually a common terrain which would be at least minimally acceptable to all parties I think the challenge often with terrorist groups is there is not an acceptable Zopa to reach thank you that's very helpful Fabian thank you chair um Professor Evans can I move us to Central Asia to look at the threats coming from there I wondered how seriously you consider the threat of terrorism to be in places like Tajikistan and some of the other Caucasus Nations and how serious is the threat overall emanating from Central Asia certainly with respect to the Nationals of those countries who partake in Terror attacks or become foreign Fighters so if I may I think I would sort of distinguish between the threat posed to Central Asian states by those uh networks and groups and the Fret post to uh the UK Homeland from those groups I think the Fret post to UK Homeland is relatively slim uh but I think the Fret post to potentially to UK Nationals elsewhere Is Not absent and the Fret post opposed to countries like Tajikistan uh is is real um and uh although again the the security services in most countries have generally been fairly effective at identifying and containing threats within most countries from those groups is that because they sorry to interrupt you is that because they're a hangover from Soviet times and they still have the infrastructure of the Soviet uh mechanism for repression at times I think they Al get quite a lot of external assistance from Regional actors uh be it from the Chinese or indeed from a Russian Federation um but I think it's also that many of the um actors and networks for example with tajic groups or with USC groups are present in Afghanistan or they're present in Syria and Iraq rather than actually present in Central Asia so the you know the operating Terrain in Central Asia has not been very uh very easy one for some of these groups the fagana valley which was an anchor for some of these groups in the 199 became less permissive for them uh and so you see basically this networking and operating and training in diaspora uh in bothos in Botho spaces particularly the Middle East and particularly Afghanistan uh and you also see a focus on trying to conduct attacks in Moscow and we saw that uh very sadly in in recent weeks is is is there any particular one of the republics that stands out over and above the others for its contribution towards terrorist activities in terms of its population in terms of its population I think usbekistan generally has been probably the chief uh USBC Nationals were one of the most predominant groupings within the Islamic movement of usbekistan uh the tragic elements have generally been from affiliated with this group jamat an I mean again the last time I looked at it low hundreds um mainly based in the east of the country in G Barak sham uh but again many of those individuals are based elsewhere it's an interesting Counterpoint to this argument that organized crime or always ties up with terrorism because for many of the smuggling networks that smuggle in particular narcotics in eastern Tajikistan it's not in their business interest to maintain ties with terrorist groups that their interest in getting their product through that terrain uh so so sometimes there is a lack of Confluence of interest between these organized crime groups and terrorist groups very much and on that do you think when it comes to our approach to areas where we see vast amounts of terrorism within a country are we doing enough on the governments and capacity building and essentially political settlement side or do you think we create a space of political settlements where political teams run around do a lot of very hard work but essentially if we can't get the Zer as you call it essentially if there's no real room for uh agreement that essentially we let CT take over and we kind of drop the political settlement and government's work to one side yes capacity building might continue know helping a host government improve its Armed Forces but do you think we are we essentially can only throw one ball in the air at once and we're either going for political settlements or we see it as a CT operation or do you think that's slightly unfair I I think there's a wider longitudinal piece here about joined up government you know whatever you call it whether you know you you ascribe to sort of Mark Seal's Fusion Doctrine or whatever nomenclature integration I think is the name of the day in in recent years in in in the British government um but there is a marked step change if we think about the history of UK the UK and international counterterrorism actually the foreign office really developed the capability in the 19 60s and 70s it was still relatively niche as late as the mid 1990s and it's only really been after 9/11 but it became it acquired the the Cadence and the resourcing and the cross government footprint that it uh now has today a a big lesson of that was integration across government uh in the 1960s and70s it was about dealing in particular with aircraft hijackings uh so joint work internationally through the international civil aviation organization uh joining up with Airlines uh joining up internationally because you're talking about Point too with airport security was really important um you know after 911 I think it was the ability to try to fuse development and diplomacy and Justice and the security and intelligence services along with sort of political work by uh by diplomats if I may I'll offer a brief anecdote on this when I worked in Pakistan in 2007 to 2009 uh we were sent a a prosecutor from Crown prosecution service who who joined us uh who now sadly deceased um uh and the cultures of integration across government took time in this particular case uh he he persuaded Us by being a very excellent cocktail maker by virtue of having me a cocktail waiter in Newcastle in in a previous previous Avatar but more importantly he was someone who is very critical to ensuring successful sustained prosecutions in the UK so once once you have integration proving its worth in terms of carry fruit to prevention disruption prosecutions I think people take it on board um trying to get that integration right I'm not claiming that in the British government it's perfect but I would argue that it's a lot better than it was 20 25 years ago and in many of the other governments I've visited and worked with I think they still struggle with that uh police officers don't talk to intelligence Services intelligence Services don't Dain to talk to police officers uh data sharing between government agencies is very difficult and and institutional cultures and indeed cultures of accountability and Authority inhibit that data sharing and coordination within government but so crucial at home as well as overseas thank that's really helpful Dan thank you chair good afternoon Professor Evans you've talked a bit about the the crossover within government how effectively do you think the FCD has exerted its influence on uh these counterterrorism policies bilaterally and multilaterally in recent years well not trying to be factious about it but I obviously I think that you know we are in a world where sovereignty matters to Most states um and so I think States will ultimately make Sovereign decisions about their national security policy including around counterterrorism uh I think the UK can bring to bear influence and insight and information sharing and it does in many different in many different different spaces uh I would perhaps talk more about the uh un and multilateral architecture where I think the UK has been a credible accelerant of international coordination cooperation and partly because I think the UK has been willing to talk in private as well as sometimes in public about the failures and the challenges of that integration as well as about the successes so it hasn't just been the UK on transmit about here of the ways in which we've done this well or here are ways in which we've achieved success but it's also been a recognition about how difficult it is to get this integrated culture within government but also integrated coordination and cooperation internationally um particularly when you're talking about states that uh uh do not share good bilateral relations um so you know it's one thing for the UT for the UK to coordinate with like-minded States or states with which it has relatively good bilateral relations it's quite another thing to achieve coordination between uh two Waring States or sparring states in the International System system and that I think is where Regional organizations and where the UN system can sometimes play a useful a useful role can you tell us a bit more about where you think the UK needs to strengthen those bilateral relationships where where should we look uh to build closer relationships perhaps where we don't currently have them again I I I think I might pause given my you know my still suspended animation uh you know government government identity but but if I may what I would say is this I think there's some there's always a trade-off now and the next um there is a delicious Norwegian word tids clema which means time squeeze it's it's a it's a description of a parent of an under five-year-old I'm sure various committee members will recognize that in different stages in my life I have a I have an eight-week year old baby at the moment um time squeeze applies to most government policy making including National Security policymaking one of the challenges of of the time pressures and the crisis pressures on National Security policym is you focus on the immediate crisis now and immediate threat reporting now rather than think prospectively about where threat might come from in three years or five years or seven years time and so I think there is a really powerful argument here and it's difficult to do in a in a tightly resourced environment for how do you maintain multiple relationships with almost every state on the planet um including the states where actually at might not be an immediate priority it might not not even be a middle level priority um so we can all do the matrices where we measure the states that matter most against the current threat environment or against the current uh um structures of transnational structures of al-Qaeda or Das Affiliates um but just just as we're foreign policymaking there is I think a powerful argument for an insurance approach to it and an insurance approach is you have as wide area network as possible and you have relations with as many different states and actors as possible because uh actually one constant element of foreign policy which is also one constant element of Terror you know counterterrorism National Security policymaking is surprise you think the fact that we're moving in the direction of a multi-polar Geo geopolitical environment is making this even more challenging I I think one aspect of that M multipolarity makes it even more challenging which is um a growing dist trust internationally growing hedging a greater willingness to use hybrid uh hybrid policies overseas uh for a range of States particularly hostile states to the UK uh which I think encourages potentially the bad behaviors of supporting proxies or supporting terrorist groups for some states but it also inhibits for trust that is necessary to sharing information one of I think huge gains of the international campaign both against Al-Qaeda and against was the growth of an architecture of International Information sharing and you can see that in multiple different aspects uh sharing biometric data on citizens and their travel uh the introduction of a global exit control regime so that we're measured when we exit a country as well as when we enter crucial for tracking and disrupting foreign terrorist Fighters um but also the willingness to find Vehicles whether it's Interpol or bilateral mechanisms or through Europe mechanisms or through other like-minded mechanisms um to share uh Advanced threat intelligence um and indeed to publish that information externally so the the the the greater use of travel advisories uh to warn uh to warn citizens not just of the UK but to provide shared environments to help shape risk uh Decisions by citizens has all been a massive plus that is I think at risk in some ways in an international environment where trust is reducing not increasing and that will almost inevitably have an effect on counterterrorism information sharing as well despite the fact that when I worked U for the UN Security Council counterterrorism was one of the very few spaces where uh Russia China France the US and the UK were still able to find common ground and it was still possible to find Common Ground between authoritarian States and Democratic states with two Health warnings one was obviously human rights compliance uh where the temptation to mistreat detainees and to not uh treat citizens with the same Norms that we would behave with was was evident in many states uh and the other was the temptation to uh to uh misattribute domestic political opponents as terrorists um so you know there are a number of occasions when I'd have discret conversations with member states of un who wanted to sanction their political opponents and I had to gently explain but the likelihood of getting out through the UN Security Council was low thank you very much can I just Professor Evans just ask you how you think the increasing tendency for state sponsored terrorism uh that we're seeing today uh how that undermines this sort of multilateral uh approach towards curbing terrorism worldwide there a complete contradiction isn't there there is a contradiction there and I'm I'm not saying it's massive growing tendency across all states but I but I think that the risk appetite is growing amongst certain Estates um and that risk that growing risk appetite has then a a secondary effect on other states as well um so I I do think that's something of concern does it fundamentally uh destroy the fabric of international cooperation coordinations standards sanctions on counterterrorism no does it undermine though The credibility of those regimes yes it does um and there is a challenge there if you are a state that covertly supports terrorist groups your likelihood to invest heavily and robustly in the architecture of counterterrorism internationally is perhaps somewhat reduced you don't want to expose yourself to uh embarrassment or to charges of hypocrisy thank you very much for that can I move on to uh a question about the UK's influence in multilateral organizations um concerned with countering terrorism and that is the the merger of the foreign and Commonwealth office with the department for International Development do you think it has influenced our ability uh to be considered a leading actor in this area or indeed to be a leading actor in the area again ordinarily I would I would demure from answering that given given I'm still you know still in the service but actually on this one I would also I would also say I don't I don't think it's material actually to it I I think the integration I I would again speak to this integration of insight across government uh and I think there's a really important Insight that's gain from development as well as from diplomacy and I'll give a practical example relating to counterterrorist finance uh if you want to understand informal remittance flows haala and hundi systems um actually the people with the greatest expertise on that of a development Community it's looking at remittance flows it's looking at micro payments internationally but that's also relevant for understanding the peer-to-peer funding that supports terrorist organizations so I think that that's one example of where Insight from the field of development can be very helpful to the world of National Security but also vice versa uh and so you actually have the ability to have a constructive dialogue and debate which hopefully leads to better policymaking which issues relating to terrorism do you think the UK could contribute more effectively to in the international fora for example the repatriation of British Nationals from the camps in Northeast Syria which we've already discussed today I mean how else could we help contribute more effectively uh within the international Forum so let me pick one one issue that was certainly on the UN security or has been on the UN security council's agenda for some time which is kidnap for ransom payments to terrorist organizations um so at one level if you know a lot of terrorism is relatively inexpensive not withstanding the capital that is accured to D through D's temporary control over lots of territory and resource in Iraq and and Syria um many terrorist organizations oper operate on budgets that would uh uh you know probably uh not match the expense accounts of many people in public servants um and certainly would fall below the threshold for suspicious transaction reporting in the counter terrorist and anti counter anti- money laundering uh from Frameworks internationally um if you have large payments of multiple millions of dollars for hostages where that money is accruing to an Al-Qaeda affiliate or to a DA affiliate that is really material to increasing the risk to all citizens elsewhere um so I think kidnap for ransom uh you know both publicizing the threat of it and also trying to encourage and Foster greater action on it has been a helpful role not just for the UN Security Council but I think the UK has played a a leadership role within that for some years and indeed so of the Americans because they have a particularly dedicated official to kidnap for ransom uh issues and and crimes they do and and I think I think you know the the US and the UK have been you know it's a particular area of robust anglo-american uh coordination on policy agenda U but it is also an area again where the UN Security Council has passed a Security Council resolution uh you know against the practice the practice does still continue in some instances with some states uh and it's that trade-off I think sometimes is politically very difficult for States including some democracies which is what do you do now to protect and secure your citizens versus what is the effect of that policy action later on and kidnap for ransom payments to terrorist organizations there a classic case in point where what you do now generally generates great greater threat to your citizens later on thank you that's very helpful can I just last Point chair in your assessment do you think sanctions are an effective tool with which to counter terrorism both nationally and uh the multilateral level or are they very blunt instrument I I think targeted sanctions Can Be an Effective tool of disruption and of messaging delegitimization as well um and ideally of terance um but I think it's important not to overemphasize what targeted sanctions can achieve um and I would particularly take here um uh travel banss and asset freezes uh it's tempting to think well actually this doesn't really make much difference you know if if you for example Osama Bin Laden used to be on the UN Security Council sanctions list one suspects that that didn't necessarily have that much effect on on him um but if you can disrupt for example financiers l die sh of Taliban or to Al-Qaeda and it becomes more difficult for those people to move across Borders or to use the formal banking system that actually can have a disruptive effect on most organizations so sometimes I think Temptation with sanctions is to focus on the level ones for the leaders of organizations rather than focusing in on where are sanctions where are targeted sanctions impacting on the fundraisers if you like the equivalent of party agents you know if you disrupt a a party agent for an MP you potentially have quite a significant effect on their local operations and their elector electoral campaigns people will tend to know who the MP is they're not necessarily going to know who the party agent is um so a bit of it is is how do you then focus in on the on on the nodal points in networks that will be most influential the other argument I think it's sometimes used against um targeted sanctions is does it really have much effect if you're talking about a cash economy if you're talking about reaching into parts of Yemen or parts of Somalia for example or parts of Afghanistan but even there it can have a chilling effect in a positive way let me give an example um so if you are somebody uh engaging in financial investment in Somalia or Afghanistan sometimes what you do to dis um to reduce your risk as you invest is you get co-investments from people from other groups around you in your area if you are the subject of sanctions you may have no bank account but is materially affected you may not be using uh Western Union or trans or wise or any other money service business to move money overseas uh but you do need the co-investment by your peers to invest in whatever business you want to invest in in Somalia or Yemen or Afghanistan and if you are sanctioned those peers May well have a legitimate business or a banking or the use of formal banking elsewhere so suddenly you find yourself your your other business activities particularly for your Finance year can be affected so for those who are are cynical about the reach of targeted sanctions I would counter I I would counterpose with the fact that I think often on the financial tool sometimes it can have actually greater disruptive effect than people think um but it is important to see it only it's one element in a suite of tools that can be used I would also pause and just talk about the importance of um the importance of the travel ban and of um the deterrent effect on the Travel ban uh fine you may not be able to stop somebody crossing a border between uh you know taking a boat between Yemen and East Africa but you can stop them getting on a plane and the world of Biometrics today makes it very difficult you know the days of uh M grading on the multiple identities are gone when it comes to uh uh Movement by Aviation or movement across any border that's skilled by Biometrics so again the fact that sanctions lists have gone from an analog sanctions list literally a list of names and addresses to a much more digital framework with Biometrics where possible Allied to interpole Red notices so the ability to exercise the interpo system linked into screening systems in airports screening systems uh on entry and exit from countries disrupts for travel plans again of financiers or level twos or level threes finally on the deterrent effect if I may I mean I do think there is something that many of these groups crave which is legitimacy and if they're not seen as equal legitimate actors to States if they're seen as being uh Beyond uh Beyond reasonableness by the international State Community I think that's important is an important message in multiple ways as well very much that's really helpful Professor uh thank you Professor Evans could I ask you about um the sort of the rising uh polarization internationally and is that is there a risk with that that countries and regions start to tackle terrorism and counterterrorism themselves rather than using existing multilateral agencies yes I think there is a risk but but but I think that's offset somewhat by the value that people have seen uh from for example some of the sharing of advanced passenger information or some of the sharing of uh uh red notices via Interpol mechanisms on individuals of concern so can some of these systems be misused by government they certainly can so the risk is do you get dissidents put on there do you get certain countries overusing these mechanisms uh for domestic political purposes in particular if they are authoritarian countries and wish to inhibit the civil rights of their citizens or indeed of opponents elsewhere um so I think I think the benefits of this International architecture of data sharing and of uh advanc sharing about threats uh probably mean that there will still be the use of it by all states States but I think where there are particular breakdowns in trust what we what we will see is the loss of that bilateral connectivity between states so even for states that have often had very difficult bilateral relations uh when when it comes to a threat by terrorist to kill innocent civilians in a city or a public event in in that country information will still be shared and I would point to the um uh the uh public advisory that was issued uh about the threat in Moscow um you know that that I think is an example of that in practice there is a commitment I think to protecting civilians that exists in many of the uh counterterrorism units across the world and in and in the bureaucracies around government onos the question I would have is to what extent do geopolitical frictions um which is not about multipolarity per se it's about actually poor bilateral relations between states to what to what extent does that then inhibit uh the sharing of amongst experts or a sharing between services or a sharing between police forces of information that would be material to preventing terrorist attacks that kill civilians can I move on to the um un Security Council and um what reform we could or should see of that organization um to help uh protect the you know stability in the Middle East and in your assessment um which country or countries perhaps should be um given a permanent seat on the security Council thank you very much for that question it's it's a it's a wonderful question I I would sort of describe it roughly as the same question as who should I invite to my 50th birthday party uh it's a question that seems easy to answer until you start listing the names on a sheet of paper and work out that your Venue has space for 30 but you have 50 people you'd like to invite 20 of whom will be offended if they don't uh if they don't receive an invitation uh so you know there are of course a range of credible candidates I think it is important to signal that the UK was the first P5 member this is often forgotten the UK was the first P5 member to publicly endorse India's bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council in early 2002 uh and that is something that you know was very important in my time as a diplomat in India but I think it is important to recognize that UK was a first mover on that amongst un Security Council Members uh but you know that balance between efficacy of having a small Council that can reach decisions speedily uh how and where that use of veto is exercised um with the balance of uh representation across the UN system uh is a delicate one self-evidently the UN Security Council needs reform how that reform should be manifested and who should end up on the council is I think a trickier question and that's where so much of international debate as laye of late um but I I do think it's important to note this is perhaps pulling back to the multi-polar operating environment where in now um it's tempting sometimes if you're sitting in the security Council to think that we live in a world of 15 where five maybe slightly more equal them 10 yeah we don't we live in a world of 193 and many of the Frameworks which would shape counterterrorism and indeed much other International policy we're thinking about the regulation of uh or International agreements standards around technology they're made amongst 193 countries not amongst 15 um so one of the challenges I think for UK influence and engagement internationally is that relationship again with 193 is important not just a the membership of a 15 I suppose someone might argue that um you know you wouldn't have 193 but at the same time you might have more um Regional representation so for example it's not my view it's just something that I've read you know some people think that perhaps Saudi Arabia as the regions regions you know Leading Light if you like might be one of those countries that you be considered to be given Security Council membership do you have a view on that especially with the Middle East being what it is at the moment as I said individual candidacies pull me back into birthday party terrain you said you were going to cancel your birthday party that's true I I I I you know it's going to be a virtual event obviously it's already passed um but I but I think i' I'd pull back and say look I think there is a legitimate debate to say can you really have a continent without recognition or or a significant um uh grouping within International within the International System without representation there is of course representation through uh uh um elected members the E10 of the security Council but that is materially different to being a permanent member of the security Council Council uh I think on counterterrorism it's important to recognize that you know there is this balance between Security Council mechanisms and general assembly mechanisms um the general assembly activity on counterterrorism is really important if we're thinking about prevent and deradicalization some of the capacity building issues internationally uh the funding mechanisms for uh capacity building and support uh the UN office of drugs and crime work um uh the UN office of counterterrorism work um the security Council plays this crucially important role I think around around the sanctions regime the chapter 7 capabilities of the security Council but also I would argue an unsung but a hugely important part of international counterterrorism Machinery is the 1540 Committee of experts working for the UN Security Council this is the committee of experts that look at um chemical biological nuclear and radiological risk uh linked to terrorist groups they do extraordinarily valuable work it's important work it is some in some ways viewed as a technical Backwater but I think with the rapid onset growth of technology and the ability that to learn things today uh can be done in a in a at a pace uh using the access to the internet the access to gray literature but could not be done 10 or 15 years ago and there is a a a a worring question there about that you know you add in uh the ability of uh generative AR and I realize you know everybody has to for marketing purposes mention AI at every meeting nowadays but but out with that marketing pitch you know the risk of um the risk of accelerated uh capabilities within terrorist groups is something that I think should be a concerned for us and it's a very different world to worrying about um toxins or cbrn used by groups in the 1990s when I first worked on it uh my academic background was doing a PhD on some groups uh in in Pakistan um so that that concern again leads us back to the 193 because actually the mechanisms for international regulation there may be bilateral mechanisms there may be European mechanisms there are obviously things that the UK nationally will do and will do with like-minded Partners uh but actually an international architecture on that is important to Encompass all states the 1540 committee is the anchor of resource and expertise in the UN system on that and it deserves support we look back to you know when I was a kid in terrorism was um fertilizer and shoe boxes in Northern Ireland and now you know it's um drones it's cruise missiles you know uh the houthis are prescribed and they've got some significant um kit available to them where do you see I mean it's a bit of a crystal ball I know we're talking about AI and and everyone has to it's almost like we didn't talk about that you know two years ago now it's the only game in town that we didn't see it coming um so what what what what where do you see the UN in and other multilaterals in five or 10 years time trying to be ahead of that I mean we we're talking about things we already know and having to deal with those but be ahead of that you know to counterterrorism in the future look I I have a particular preoccupation with long range policymaking I teach anticipatory policymaking at blsc I also teach technology data science and policym uh and including around National Security and counterterrorism um again it's this problem that that for governments and for international organizations The Temptations to do now rather than next um and next is often the optionality you know that that's the thing that gets deprioritized against for super prioritization of what what we're dealing with now I think the UN can play a useful role in some of that um Blended analysis from all states you know the UN can talk to the sudin and the Russians and the chines and the Iranians as well as talk to the Israelis the Americans ourselves and the French um so the ability to talk to everybody is a particular and I would argue largely unique capability of the UN particularly of these un Security Council expert groups um I I would hope that the UK government as with other governments is in position where uh whatever might be said in strategy documents and I think sometimes it's tempting to get over over obsessed with how many lines are mentioned in a particular government strategy document about counterterrorism over some other subject I think there's something really material here about how much capacity within government is dedicated to two things one anticipation so how much have you got people thinking about where might the Fret go next what does it mean around uavs uh what do we think about the future of toxins and terrorist groups what are some of the implications of new technologies around there um but also uh how do you then uh factoring not just that uh longrange thinking about what next but the insurance policy of making sure that we have enough Insight on a Tajikistan or the Maldives or Panama as well as on the more obvious countries and issues that we might prioritize and look at and I think one of the um one of the perennial challenges are government is how to do next as well as now and how to build that in not just to resilience planning and resilience and counterterrorism but also how do you build that into strategic policymaking so it's not just have you got a group of people working on this in dstl or in the in FCD but to what extent is this ventilated and aired at senior official level a permanent secretary or director General level but also at ministerial level um because again that's that's the subject that always get squeezed out of every committee meeting do we have then I mean do we have the bandwidth you know I I was talking about Yemen earlier because that's an example and to Mr Dean who said that you know it was sort of obvious to him that while the houthis are in negotiations with the Saudis to try and and the UN for the road map to peace um they're now devolving the the attacks on the southern lot to alqaeda um does do we I don't know the the multilaterals as well as the UK do we have the bandwidth to see these things coming and and you were saying you know about look Beyond now um it doesn't look like we are doing that so I wonder you know with a pen holder in Yemen for example uh and yet we don't we didn't see most of what has happened even with the houthis in the Red Sea and now with Al-Qaeda being you know resurgent in in Yemen again do we have the bandwidth to see is that is that the problem well can I answer that by dividing it into two I mean I I think I think there's one element here which is do we often get things wrong yes of course do all governments often get things wrong yes of course because our ability to predict the future strangely hasn't yet reached sort of AI Avatar um standards so I think I think we we we we you know the ability to look forward doesn't guarantee the ability to accurately predict there have been improvements in British weather forecasting we now can uh have the same confidence about weather forecasting for twice the length of period that we used to have I think 20 or 30 years ago uh certainly given given weather in April uh and in early May uh you know there's no guarantee that weather forecasting is concurrent with your ability to predict whether you need an umbrella or not in in in London for example um so I I wouldn't necessarily hold us too harshly to account for not being able to predict all the time um insight and expertise doesn't always lead to predictive capability um I think that question of bandwidth however is a really important one and you know to what extent is there senior level bandwidth to be fair on government all governments and all International organizations you can't do everything everywhere all at once it's just not possible there's only so much time in the day there's only so much attention time or Red Box time or committee time to attend to different issues but I think this is where having a wide area network diplomatically internationally is really important it is where and this is not a ple academic expertise necessarily but it's where expertise on countries and languages and groups becomes very important um I uh learned an awful lot in the 1990s by sitting at the feet of somebody who'd been in the Diplomatic service in the 1980s and who'd be given a nearly two-year leave of absence to go and study islamist groups around the world yeah as was a visiting student at soas um and you know but that requires the redundancy to allow somebody to go off and spend two years to learn about that and I would argue that was really material to UK interest to have somebody who's an expert on islamist movements everywhere from Indonesia to uh Nigeria but it takes a degree of redundancy there is a risk I would argue for the UK PLC on counterterrorism which is on the one hand we have and you you met many of these experts in in recent evidence sessions we have an extraordinary group of terrorism experts from St Andrews to King's College London I think Professor Peter neyman gave evidence to you Antonio gisti and others um that's good news but we have far fewer people today who spent time on the ground uh among islamist groups doing that kind of anthropological field workor because actually after 911 that became very dangerous and difficult to do so I spent a chunk of my time as a PhD student in the 1990s working interviewing members of terrorist organizations now I couldn't get that frankly for a risk committee nowadays in University probably rightly so yeah but also the risk environment has shifted very fundamentally but you can't necessarily do that kind of field work anymore so I would argue that one of the risks we have as the UK which is also true for other Pier Nations is we have a reduced uh capability within Academia but it gives you that really granular on the ground understanding of what does political Islam look like in country x uh what does um radical right-wing terrorist or radical uh you know radical neist terrorism looked like uh in in this in this University environment for example because we have fewer people who've done that experiential ethnographic on the ground field work with languages uh in high-risk environments um and that so so on the one hand we are have more insight on the other hand we have less Matt should concern us if if we're thinking about blinking forward to try and understand the future do we have the expertise and insight not necessarily just within Musto pipe of his Majesty's government but do we have that within UK PLC I would argue the jury's out on some of the expertise we might require is there um are we sort of Our Own Worst Enemy in some ways so for example you know parts of government will uh in Africa where we won't um sign any export guarantees if it includes fossilized fuels for example um and so British businesses don't bid for business over there they they don't know if they can trust some of the governments to pay they'd need to have some sort of support from the government in order to uh give them the Comfort to go and do that but while they're moving out and the Chinese and Russians are moving in because they don't have the same set of values as we do that's the British not the establishment necessarily but British businesses and others moving out are we losing that you know that that I'm talking about bandwidth but are we losing that sort of General more so than just the Academia and um you know language Specialists and the rest are we just losing that by vacating these spaces and allowing you know our adversaries to all intens and purposes to come and fill the the vacuum that we leave look I mean I my expertise isn't on S trade diplomacy so I couldn't really talk about sort of export guarantees and and and the impact on on for example small and mediumsized Enterprises in the UK um but you know thinking about you know the UK presence overseas what do we benefit from we benefit from the fact we have a huge UK diaspora globally we don't even know exactly the number but we've some got something like six million Brits live beyond our borders we have more Britains living in the Indo Pacific than France has French citizens which is a Hardy reminder when we talk about the Indo Pacific um or certainly we we're on a par um so I agree with you British business people overseas um uh uh people working for NGS overseas uh British teachers overseas uh British retirees and residents overseas are part of that pleora of insight and knowledge that we have about other countries and relationship the tissue of relationships we have with other countries um and I'm not you know Academia is I think obviously I would say this as an academic wouldn't I I I think it's a useful Avatar and and and vehicle for insight and often certain forms of deep Insight it's by no means the only one and danger slightly is that academics and journalists and diplomats and business people all look at each other and think well KY you know we know more than you do right um and having inhabited some of these different silos actually each of these silos brings different forms of insight different forms of relationships if I want to understand uh International financing of terrorism or if I want to understand U the evolution of Technologies and geopolitics I'm going to reach to the private sector I'm not going to reach to government most of the time thank you very much chair um can I move us back to UK governance how do you think the transition from the conflict stability and Security fund the cssf to this Integrated Security fund will affect the UK's engagement on counterterrorism internationally will it make any difference or will it just remain the same will it remain the same or change so so I think we'll have to see uh as that transition takes place I I wouldn't want to underestimate the degree to which the creation of ped merge funding transformed the whiteall landscape transform the whiteall landscape and and I explain uh in fact I don't think we meant to say whiteall anymore because obviously it's beyond London and MF East whiteall and Glasgow and York and Darlington and I'm sure I haven't mentioned other places as well um I should remember that from my time in the cabinet office um but but I but I think there is a a hugely important ingredient here which is sometimes less spoken about it's not just the shared funding and the ability to engage in capacity building or work on Insight or support bilateral projects or multilateral projects it's actually the fact that this shared funding required shared governance and it required shared governance at grade seven level in government not just at senior Civil Service level in government so it's one thing you know often directors and director Generals in government will work closely together because you're beginning to be in my Apex system uh within uh central government it's much more difficult to get you know this bit of the mod mod to work with this bit of um the home office and this bit of FCD um the huge value of these shared funds from my perspective was it forced joiny uh with different operating cultures with different parts of government and that joiny helped educate U when I was doing cssf in its early days it was one of the vehicles for understanding ing defense insights into the international policy issues I was working on and to understand development and home office insights into both policy areas so I I would hope um certainly no detrimental effect I hope it continues that pathway of encouraging integration across government but but not without without punishing the particular forms of vertical expertise or application but also required do you think there's a risk that the UK focuses too heavily on threats which only impact our national security I mean surely that would affect the threats of international terrorism more broadly isn't a threat to all of us a threat to each of us so again I would I perhaps would Parry a little bit I mean I think the I think what you've seen consistently is combination of the two yes you've seen successive governments right back to the 1960s prioritize threat to the UK Homeland and to British citizens so there was more investment in countering uh Northern Ireland based groups or uh groups that were targeting the UK rather than International terrorist groups that didn't the UK invested more resource commiting November 17th in Greece because it targeted British personnel and threatened British tourists than it did uh on S luminosa in Peru which did less targeting of British citizens or or or officials interrup shouldn't we be equally concerned about the attacks on the Charlie uh publication as anything here in the UK because France what happens in France could easily happen here absolutely so so so I I think on the one hand prioritization of UK citizens as as the prime focus seems reasonable to me and at least as as a UK citizen I would also I think expect that a government um at the same time the British government has has invested you know over many years in that International architecture investing in the capabilities of the international civil aviation organization not the you know it's not a organization that trips off a tongue but it plays a hugely important role in uh Aviation Security and airport security the UK invested in that it had a beneficial effect for all not just for the UK some of the capacity building work that the UK has done uh will be in countries where there is no you know there's no Prime threat to UK citizens or to UK interests but there is a a net interest there is a particular area where this is a threat to one is a threat to all because of often the use of third countries as Pathways to as vectors to attack UK interests can be there we saw that with foreign terrorist Fighters where if you didn't want to come up on a risk register by flying straight into Birmingham what you did would you fly to Malta first and then fly to Birmingham or you fly somewhere else you know fly to Latin America and then fly to the UK um so all countries are relevant to the threat to the UK all countries are also relevant to the important principle but it's not right to threaten or kill or maim civilians in the name of a violent ideology whatever that violent ideology might be so that's where I think reasserting the universality of counterterrorism is always important for the UK government it's a it's a it's a fundamental moral principle as well absolutely is there anything Professor Evans that perhaps we should have asked you and didn't or that you might like to add before we wrap up thank you chair I mean all I would say is I I do think the technology aspect on this is hugely important um and that's not just in the context of radicalization online and self- radicalization it's also about the peer-to-peer ability to share capabilities and to improve the competence and uh danger posed by terrorist groups uh that is something it is of live concern to the UK government and to other governments uh but I think it's something that should be very firmly on our radar thank you Professor Evans we'll end the session there thank you very much order order thank you